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ABSTRACT
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are fast becoming ubiquitous
for their ability to attain good accuracy in various machine
learning tasks. A DNN’s architecture (i.e., its hyper-param-
eters) broadly determines the DNN’s accuracy and perfor-
mance, and is often confidential. Attacking a DNN in the
cloud to obtain its architecture can potentially provide major
commercial value. Further, attaining a DNN’s architecture
facilitates other, existing DNN attacks.
This paper presents Cache Telepathy: a fast and accurate
mechanism to steal a DNN’s architecture using the cache
side channel. Our attack is based on the insight that DNN
inference relies heavily on tiled GEMM (Generalized Matrix
Multiply), and that DNN architecture parameters determine
the number of GEMM calls and the dimensions of the matri-
ces used in the GEMM functions. Such information can be
leaked through the cache side channel.
This paper uses Prime+Probe and Flush+Reload to attack
VGG and ResNet DNNs running OpenBLAS and Intel MKL
libraries. Our attack is effective in helping obtain the architec-
tures by very substantially reducing the search space of target
DNN architectures. For example, for VGG using OpenBLAS,
it reduces the search space from more than 1035 architectures
to just 16.
1. INTRODUCTION
For the past several years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
have increased in popularity thanks to their ability to attain
high accuracy and performance in a multitude of machine
learning tasks — e.g., image and speech recognition [1, 2],
scene generation [3], and game playing [4]. An emerging
framework that provides end-to-end infrastructure for using
DNNs is Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) [5, 6].
In MLaaS, trusted clients submit DNNs or training data to
MLaaS service providers (e.g., an Amazon or Google data-
center). Service providers host the DNNs, and allow remote
untrusted users to submit queries to the DNNs for a fee.
Despite its promise, MLaaS provides new ways to under-
mine the privacy of the hosted DNNs. An adversary may be
able to learn details of the hosted DNNs beyond the official
query API. For example, an adversary may try to learn the
DNN’s architecture (i.e., its hyper-parameters). These are
the parameters that give the network its shape, such as the
number and types of layers, the number of neurons per layer,
and the connections between layers.
The architecture of a DNN broadly determines the DNN’s
accuracy and performance. For this reason, obtaining it often
has high commercial value. In addition, it generally takes a
large amount of time and resources to try to obtain it by tun-
ing hyper-parameters through training. Further, once a DNN’s
architecture is known, other attacks are possible, such as the
model extraction attack [7] (which obtains the weights of the
DNN’s edges), and the membership inference attack [8],[9]
(which determines whether a input was used to train the
DNN).
Yet, stealing a DNN’s architecture is challenging. First,
DNNs have a multitude of hyper-parameters, which makes
brute-force guesswork unfeasible. Further, the DNN design
space has been growing with time, which is further aggravat-
ing the adversary’s task.
This paper proves that despite the large search space, at-
tackers can quickly and accurately recover DNN architectures
in the MLaaS setting using the cache size channel. Our in-
sight is that DNN inference relies heavily on tiled GEMM
(Generalized Matrix Multiply), and that DNN architecture
parameters determine the number of GEMM calls and the di-
mensions of the matrices used in the GEMM functions. Such
information can be leaked through the cache side channel.
We present an attack that we call Cache Telepathy. It is the
first cache side channel attack on modern DNNs. It targets
DNN inference on general-purpose processors, which are
widely used for inference in existing MLaaS platforms, such
as Facebook’s [10] and Amazon’s [11]. 1
We demonstrate our attack by implementing it on a state-
of-the-art platform. We use Prime+Probe and Flush+Reload
to attack the VGG and ResNet DNNs running OpenBLAS
and Intel MKL libraries. Our attack is effective at helping
obtain the architectures by very substantially reducing the
search space of target DNN architectures. For example, for
VGG using OpenBLAS, it reduces the search space from
more than 1035 architectures to just 16.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. It provides a detailed analysis of the mapping of DNN
hyper-parameters to the number of GEMM calls and their
arguments.
2. It implements the first cache-based side channel attack to
extract DNN architectures on general purpose processors.
3. It evaluates the attack on VGG and ResNet DNNs running
OpenBLAS and Intel MKL libraries.
1Facebook currently relies heavily on CPUs for machine learning
inference [10]. Most instance types provided by Amazon for MLaaS
are CPUs [11].
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are a class of ML algo-
rithms that use a cascade of multiple layers of nonlinear pro-
cessing units for feature extraction and transformation [12].
There are several major types of DNNs in use today, two
popular types being fully-connected neural networks (or
multi-layer perceptrons) and convolutional neural networks
(CNNs).
DNN Architecture. The architecture of a DNN, also
called the hyper-parameters, gives the network its shape.
DNN hyper-parameters considered in this paper are:
a) Total number of layers.
b) Layer types, such as fully-connected, convolutional, or
pooling layer.
c) Connections between layers, including sequential and non-
sequential connections such as shortcuts and branches.
Non-sequential connections exist in recent DNNs, such as
ResNet [2]. For example, a shortcut consists of summing
up the output of two different layers and using the result
as input for a later layer.
d) Hyper-parameters for each layer. For a fully-connected
layer, this is the number of neurons in that layer. For a
convolutional layer, this is the number of filters, the filter
size, and the striding size.
e) The activation function in each layer, e.g., relu and sig-
moid.
DNN Weights. The DNN weights, also called parameters,
specify operands to multiply-accumulates (MACCs) in the
nested function. In a fully-connected layer, each edge out of
a neuron is a MACC with a weight; in a convolutional layer,
each filter is a sliding window that computes dot products
over input neurons.
DNN Usage. DNNs usage is two distinct phases: training
and inference. In training, the DNN designer starts with a net-
work architecture and a training set of labeled inputs, and tries
to find the DNN weights to minimize mis-prediction error.
Training is generally performed offline on GPUs and takes a
relatively long time to finish, typically hours or days [10],[13].
In inference, the trained model is deployed and used to make
real-time predictions on new inputs. For good responsiveness,
inference is generally performed on CPUs [10],[11].
Hyper-parameter tuning [14],[15] is the process of search-
ing for the ideal DNN architecture. It requires training multi-
ple DNNs with different architectures on the same data set.
The DNN architecture search space may be large, meaning
overall training takes significantly longer than the time to
train a single DNN architecture.
2.2 Prior Privacy Attacks Need Architecture
To gain insight into the importance of DNN architectures,
we discuss prior DNN privacy attacks [7, 8, 9, 16]. There are
three types of such attacks, each with a different goal. All
of them require knowing the victim’s DNN architecture. In
the following, we refer to the victim’s network as the oracle
network, its architecture as the oracle DNN architecture, and
its training data set as the oracle training data set.
In the model extraction attack [7], the attacker tries to ob-
tain the weights of the oracle network. Although this attack
is referred to as a “black-box” attack, it assumes that the
attacker knows the oracle DNN architecture at the start. The
attacker creates a synthetic data set, requests the classification
results from the oracle network, and uses such results to train
a network that uses the oracle architecture.
The membership inference attack [8],[9] aims to infer the
composition of the oracle training data set. This attack also
requires knowledge of the oracle DNN architecture. The at-
tacker creates multiple synthetic data sets and trains multiple
networks that use the oracle architecture. Then, he runs the
inference algorithm on these networks with some inputs in
their training sets and some not in their training sets. He then
compares the results and learns the output patterns of data in
the training sets. He then uses this information to analyze the
outputs of the oracle network running the inference algorithm
on some inputs, and identifies those inputs that were in the
oracle training data set.
The hyper-parameter stealing attack [16] steals the loss
function and regularization term used in ML algorithms, in-
cluding DNN training and inference. This attack also relies
on knowing the oracle DNN architecture. During the attack,
the attacker leverages the model extraction attack to learn
the DNN’s weights. He then finds the loss function that mini-
mizes the training misprediction error.
2.3 Cache-based Side Channel Attacks
Flush+Reload [17] and Prime+Probe [18] are two powerful
cache-base side channel attacks. They can extract secret
keys [19, 20] and leak kernel and process information [21,
22].
Flush+Reload requires that the attacker share secure-
sensitive code or data with the victim. This sharing can
be achieved by leveraging the page de-duplication technique.
It has been shown that de-duplication is widely deployed in
public clouds to reduce the memory footprint and improve
responsiveness [23]. In an attack, the attacker first performs
a clflush operation to the shared cache line, to push it out
of the cache. It then waits to allow the victim to execute.
Finally, it re-accesses the same cache line and measures the
access latency. Depending on the latency, it learns whether
the victim has accessed the shared line.
Prime+Probe does not require page sharing. The attacker
constructs a collection of addresses, called conflict addresses,
which map to the same cache set as the victim’s line. In an at-
tack, the attacker first accesses the conflict addresses to cause
cache conflicts with the victim’s line, and evict it from the
cache. After waiting for an interval, it re-accesses the conflict
addresses and measures the access latency. The latency is
used to infer whether the victim has accessed the line.
2.4 Threat Model
This paper develops a cache-timing attack that accurately
reveals a DNN’s architecture. The attack relies on the follow-
ing standard assumptions.
Co-location. We assume the attacker process can use tech-
niques from prior work [24, 25] to co-locate onto the same
processor chip as the victim process running DNN infer-
ence. This is feasible, as current MLaaS jobs are deployed
on shared clouds. Note that recent MLaaS, such as Amazon
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SageMaker [26] and Google ML Engine [27] allow users to
upload their own code for training and inference, instead of
using pre-defined APIs. In this case, attackers can disguise
themselves as an MLaaS process and the cloud scheduler
will be unable to separate attacker processes from victim
processes.
Code Analysis. We also assume that the attacker can an-
alyze the ML framework code and linear algebra libraries
used by the victim. These are realistic assumptions. First,
open-source ML frameworks are widely used for efficient
development of ML applications. The frameworks supported
by Google, Amazon and other companies, including Ten-
sorflow [28], Caffe [29], and MXNet [30] are all public.
Our analysis is applicable to almost all of these frameworks.
Second, the frameworks’ backends are all supported by high-
performance and popular linear algebra libraries, such as
OpenBLAS [31], Eigen [32] and MKL [33]. OpenBLAS and
Eigen are open sourced, and MKL can be reverse engineered,
as we show later. While we do not specifically address other
algorithms such as FFT or Winograd, they are all amenable
to cache-based attacks similar to those presented here.
3. ATTACK OVERVIEW
In this section, we discuss the challenge of reverse-
engineering DNN architectures and our overall attack proce-
dure.
Challenge of Reverse-Engineering DNN Architec-
tures. A DNN’s architecture can be extracted in a search
process, as shown in Figure 1. Specifically, the attacker
constructs a synthetic dataset (¬), and queries the oracle net-
work for labels or confidence values (­), which are used as
training data and labels. Then the attacker chooses a DNN
architecture from a search space (®) to train a network (¯).
Steps®-¯ repeat until an architecture is found with sufficient
prediction accuracy (°).
①construct	dataset
② query	oracle	network
③ get	a	DNN	architecture	from	a	search	space
④ train	a	substitute	network ⑥ output	substitute	architecture	and	weights⑤ accuracy	enough?
training	data
training	labels
no
yes
Figure 1: Searching DNN architectures.
This search process is extremely compute intensive, since
it involves many iterations of step ¯. Considering the depth
and complexity of state-of-the-art DNNs, training and validat-
ing each network can take hours to days. Moreover, without
any information about the architecture, the search space of
possible architectures is often intractable. Thus, reverse en-
gineering a DNN architecture by naively searching DNN
architectures is unfeasible. The goal of Cache Telepathy is to
reduce the architecture search space to a tractable size.
Overall Cache Telepathy Attack Procedure. We ob-
serve that DNN inference relies on GEMM, and that the
DNN’s hyper-parameters are closely related to the GEMM
matrix parameters. Since high-performance GEMM imple-
mentations are tuned for the cache hierarchy through matrix
blocking (i.e., tiling), we find that their cache behavior leaks
matrix parameters. In particular, the block size is public (or
can be easily deduced), and the attacker can count blocks to
learn the matrix sizes.
For our attack, we first conduct a detailed analysis of how
GEMM is used in ML frameworks, and figure out the map-
ping between DNN hyper-parameters and matrix parameters
(Section 4). Our analysis is applicable to most ML frame-
works, including TensorFlow [28], Caffe [29], Theano [34],
and MXNet [30].
Cache Telepathy includes a cache attack and post process-
ing steps. First, it uses a cache attack to monitor matrix
multiplications and obtain matrix parameters (Section 5 and
6). Then, the DNN architecture is reverse-engineered based
on the mapping between DNN hyper-parameters and matrix
parameters. Finally, Cache Telepathy prunes the possible
values of the remaining undiscovered hyper-parameters and
generates a pruned search space for the possible DNN archi-
tecture (Section 8.3).
4. MAPPING DNNS TO MATRIX PARAM-
ETERS
DNN hyper-parameters, listed in Section 2.1, can be
mapped to GEMM execution. We first discuss how the layer
type and configurations within each layer map to matrix pa-
rameters, assuming that all layers are sequentially connected
(Section 4.1 and 4.2). We then generalize the mapping by
showing how the connections between layers map to GEMM
execution (Section 4.3). Finally, we discuss what information
is required to extract the activation functions of Section 2.1
(Section 4.4).
4.1 Analysis of DNN Layers
There are two types of neural network layers whose com-
putation can be mapped to matrix multiplications, namely
fully-connected and convolutional layers.
4.1.1 Fully-connected layer
In a fully-connected layer, each neuron computes a
weighted sum of values from all the neurons in the previous
layer, followed by a non-linear transformation. The ith layer
computes outi = fi(ini⊗θi)where ini is the input vector, θi is
the weight matrix, ⊗ denotes a matrix-vector operation, f is
an element-wise non-linear function such as tanh or sigmoid,
and outi is the resulting output vector.
Matrix n_rows n_columns
Input: Ini B Ni
Weight: θi Ni Ni+1
Output: Oi B Ni+1
Table 1: Matrix sizes in a fully-connected layer.
The feed-forward computation of a fully-connected DNN
is generally performed over a batch of a few inputs at a time
(B). These multiple input vectors are stacked into an input
matrix Ini. A matrix multiplication between the input matrix
and the weight matrix (θi) produces an output matrix, which
is a stack of output vectors. We represent the computation as
Oi = fi(Ini ·θi) where Ini is a matrix with as many rows as
B and as many columns as Ni (the number of neurons in the
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ith layer); Oi is a matrix with as many rows as B and as many
columns as Ni+1 (the number of neurons in the i+1th layer);
and θi is a matrix with Ni rows and Ni+1 columns. Table 1
shows the number of rows and columns in all the matrices.
4.1.2 Convolutional layer
In a convolutional layer, a neuron is connected to only a
spatial region of neurons in the previous layer. Consider the
upper row of Figure 2, which shows the computation in the
ith layer. The layer generates an output outi by performing
convolution operations on an input image ini with multiple
filters.The input volume ini is composed of an image of size
Wi×Hi with Di channels (center of the upper row). Each
filter is of size Ri×Ri×Di (left part of the upper row).
Hi
Wi
Di Hi+1
Wi+1 Di+1
Ri
Ri Ri
filters
filter0
x
=
Ri2Di
channel0
(Wi-Ri+Pi)(Hi-Ri+Pi)
filter1……..…….. channel1……..……..
①
②
③
④
ini outi
Di
F’i in’i out’i
Ri
Di
Di+1
Figure 2: Mapping a convolutional layer (upper part of the
figure) to a matrix multiplication (lower part).
The figure highlights a neuron in outi (right part of the
upper row). The neuron is a result of a convolution operation
– an elementwise dot product of the filter shaded in dots and
the subvolume shaded in dashes. Both the subvolume and the
filter have dimensions Ri×Ri×Di. Applying a filter on the
entire input volume (ini) generates one channel of the output
(outi). Thus, the number of filters in ith layer (Di+1) is the
number of channels in the output volume.
The lower row of Figure 2 shows a common implementa-
tion that transforms the multiple convolution operations in a
layer into a single matrix multiply. First, as shown in arrow¬,
each subvolume in the input volume is stretched out into a
column.The number of elements in the column is Di×R2i .
For an input volume with dimensions Wi×Hi×Di, there are
(Wi−Ri +Pi)(Hi−Ri +Pi) such columns in total, where Pi
is the amount of zero padding. We call this transformed input
matrix in′i.
Second, as shown in arrow ­, individual filters are simi-
larly stretched out into rows, resulting in matrix F ′i . The num-
ber of rows in F ′i is the number of filters in the layer. Then,
the convolution becomes a matrix multiply: out′i = F ′i · in′i (®
in Figure 2).
Finally, the out′i matrix is reshaped back to its proper
dimensions of the outi volume (arrow ¯). Each row of
the resulting out′i matrix corresponds to one channel in the
outi volume. The number of columns of the out′i matrix is
(Wi−Ri +Pi)(Hi−Ri +Pi), which is the size of one output
channel, namely, Wi+1×Hi+1.
Table 2 shows the number of rows and columns in the
matrices involved.
Matrix n_row n_column
in′i Di×R2i (Wi−Ri +Pi)(Hi−Ri +Pi)
F ′i Di+1 Di×R2i
out′i Di+1 (Wi−Ri +Pi)(Hi−Ri +Pi) =Wi+1×Hi+1
Table 2: Matrix sizes in a convolutional layer.
The matrix multiplication described above processes a sin-
gle input. As with fully-connected DNNs, CNN inference typ-
ically consumes a batch of B inputs in a single forward pass.
In this case, a convolutional layer performs B matrix multi-
plications per pass. This is different from fully-connected
layers, where the entire batch is computed using only one
matrix multiplication.
4.2 Resolving DNN Hyper-parameters
Based on the previous analysis, we can now map DNN
hyper-parameters to matrix operation parameters assuming
all layers are sequentially connected.
4.2.1 Fully-connected networks
Consider a fully-connected network. Its hyper-parameters
are the number of layers, the number of neurons in each
layer (Ni) and the activation function per layer. As discussed
in Section 4.1, the feed-forward computation performs one
matrix multiplication per layer. Hence, we extract the number
of layers by counting the number of matrix multiplications
performed. Moreover, according to Table 1, the number of
neurons in layer i (Ni) is the number of rows of the layer’s
weight matrix (θi). Table 3 summarizes the mappings.
Structure Hyper-Parameter Value
FC network # of layers # of matrix muls
FC layeri Ni: # of neurons n_row(θi)
Conv network # of Conv layers # of matrix muls / B
Conv layeri Di+1: # of filters n_row(F ′i )
Ri:
√
n_row(in′i)
n_row(out ′i−1)filter width/height2
Pi: padding compare:
n_col(out ′i−1),n_col(in
′
i)
Pooli/ pool/stride ≈
√
n_col(out ′i )
n_col(in′i+1)Stridei+1 width/height
Table 3: Mapping between hyper-parameters and matrix pa-
rameters. FC stands for fully connected.
4.2.2 Convolutional networks
A convolutional network generally consists of four types
of layers: convolutional, Relu, pooling, and fully connected.
Recall that each convolutional layer involves a batch B of
matrix multiplications. We determine B with the following
observation: consecutive matrix multiplications will have the
same dimensions if they correspond to the same layer in a
batch. We will see that this is the case below.
In a convolutional layer i, the hyper-parameters include
the number of filters (Di+1), the filter width or height (Ri),
and the padding (Pi). We assume that the filter width and
height are the same, which is the common case. Note that
the depth of the input volume (Di) is not considered; it is an
input parameter, obtained from the previous layer.
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From Table 2, we see that the number of filters (Di+1)
is the number of rows of the filter matrix F ′i . To attain the
filter width (Ri), we note that the number of rows of the in′i
matrix is Di×R2i . Hence, we first need to find Di, which is
the number of output channels in the previous layer. It can
be obtained from the number of rows of the out ′i−1 matrix.
Overall, as summarized in Table 3, the filter width is attained
by dividing the number of rows of in′i by the number of rows
of out ′i−1 and performing the square root. In the case that the
ith layer is the first one, directly connected to the input, the
denominator of this fraction is the number of channels of the
input image, which is public information.
Padding results in a larger input matrix (in′i). After re-
solving the filter width (Ri), the value of padding can be
deduced by determining the difference between number of
columns of the output matrix of layer i−1 (out ′i−1), which is
Wi×Hi, and the number of columns of the in′i matrix, which
is (Wi−Ri+P)(Hi−Ri+P).
A pooling layer can be located in-between two convolu-
tional layers. It down-samples every channel of the input
along width and height. The hyper-parameter in this layer is
the pool width and height (assumed to be the same value),
which can be inferred as follows. Consider first the (x,y) size
of layer i, which is Wi+1×Hi+1 (Table 2), and is given by the
number of columns in matrix out ′i . Then consider the (x,y)
size of the input volume in layer i+1. If the two are the same,
there is no pooling layer; otherwise, we expect to see the next
(x,y) size reduced by the square of the pool width. In the
latter case, the exact pool dimension can be found using a
similar procedure used to determine Ri. Note that non-unit
stride results in the same dimension difference, thus we are
unable to distinguish these two.
Table 3 summarizes the mappings.
4.3 Connections Between Layers
We generalize the above mapping analysis by showing how
to map inter-layer connections to GEMM execution.
4.3.1 Mapping shortcut/branch connections
A branch or shortcut path has two characteristics that can
be expressed in GEMM execution.
First, the sink (destination) of a shortcut or the merge point
of a branch is mapped to a relatively longer inter-GEMM
latency. Generally, DNNs perform the following operations
between two consecutive GEMMs: post-processing the cur-
rent GEMM’s output (e.g., batch normalization) and pre-pro-
cessing the next GEMM’s input (e.g., padding and striding).
Therefore, the inter-GEMM latency should be linearly re-
lated to the sum of the current layer’s output size and the next
layer’s input size. However, at the sink, an extra element-wise
matrix addition or subtraction needs to be performed, which
incurs extra latency between consecutive GEMM calls.
Second, the source of a shortcut or a branch must have the
same output dimension as the sink. This is because a short-
cut/branch only connects two layers whose output dimensions
match.
2Specifically, we learn the filter spatial dimensions. If the filter isn’t
square, the search space grows depending on factor combinations
(e.g., 2 by 4 looks the same as 1 by 8). We note that filters in modern
DNNs are nearly always square.
We find that these two characteristics are very useful in
reducing the architecture search space.
4.3.2 Mapping consecutive connections
According to the mapping relationships in Table 3, a DNN
places several constraints on GEMM parameters for consecu-
tive convolutional layers. We can leverage these constraints
to identify non-sequential connections.
First, since filter width/height must be integer values, there
is a constraint on the number of rows of the input and out-
put matrix sizes between consecutive layers. Considering the
formula used to derive filter width/height in Table 3, if layer
i−1 and layer i are consecutively connected, the number
of rows in ith layer’s input matrix (n_row(ini)) must be the
product of the number of rows in the i−1th layer’s output
matrix (n_row(outi−1)) and square of an integer number.
Second, since pool size and stride size are integer values,
there is another constraint on the number of columns of the
input and output matrix sizes between consecutive layers. Ac-
cording to the formula used to derive pool/stride size, if layer
i and layer i+1 are consecutively connected, the number of
columns in ith layer’s output matrix (n_col(outi)) must be
the product of the number of columns in the i+1th layer’s
input matrix (n_col(ini+1)) and square of an integer number.
The two constraints above can help us to locate non-sequen-
tial connections. Specifically, if one of these constraints is
not satisfied, we are sure the two layers are not consecutively
connected.
4.4 Activation Functions
So far, this section discussed how DNN parameters map to
GEMM calls. Convolutional and fully-connected layers are
post-processed by element-wise non-linear functions which
do not appear in GEMM parameters. We can distinguish
relu activations from sigmoid and tanh by monitoring a
probe address in the sigmoid function using cache attacks.
We remark that nearly all convolutional layers use relu or a
close variant [35, 36, 37, 38, 2].
5. ATTACKING MATRIX MULTIPLY
We now design a side-channel attack to learn matrix multi-
plication parameters. Given the mapping from the previous
section, this attack will allow us to reconstruct the DNN
architecture.
We analyze state-of-the-art BLAS libraries, which have ex-
tensively optimized blocked matrix multiply for performance.
Examples of such libraries are OpenBLAS [31], BLIS [39],
Intel MKL [33] and AMD ACML [40]. We show in de-
tail how to extract the desired information from the GEMM
implementation in OpenBLAS. In Section 6, we generalize
our attack to other BLAS libraries, using Intel MKL as an
example.
5.1 Analyzing GEMM from OpenBLAS
Function gemm_nn from the OpenBLAS library performs
blocked matrix-matrix multiplication. It computes C = αA ·
B+βC where α and β are scalars, A is an m × k matrix, B
is a k × n matrix, and C is an m × n matrix. Our goal is to
extract m, n and k.
Like most modern BLAS libraries, OpenBLAS imple-
ments the Goto’s algorithm [41]. Such algorithm has been op-
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Figure 3: Blocked GEMM with matrices in column major.
Algorithm 1: gemm_nn in OpenBLAS
Input :Matrix A, B, C; Scalar α , β ; Block size P,Q,R;
UNROLL
Output :C := αA ·B+βC
1 for j = 0,n,R do // Loop 1
2 for l = 0,k,Q do // Loop2
3 itcopy(A[0, l],bu f _A,P,Q)
// Loop 3, 1st iteration
4 for j j = j, j+R,3UNROLL do
5 oncopy(B[l, j j],bu f _B+( j j− j)×
Q,Q,3UNROLL)
6 kernel(bu f _A,bu f _B+( j j− j)×
Q,C[l, j],P,Q,3UNROLL)
7 end
8 for i = P,m,P do // Loop 3, rest iterations
9 itcopy(A[i, l],bu f _A,P,Q)
10 kernel(bu f _A,bu f _B,C[l, j],P,Q,R)
11 end
12 end
13 end
timized for modern multi-level cache hierarchies and CPUs.
Figure 3 depicts the way the Goto’s algorithm structures
blocked matrix multiplication for a three-level cache.
The macro-kernel at the bottom performs the basic oper-
ation, multiplying a P × Q block from matrix A with a Q
× R block from matrix B. This kernel is generally written
in assembly code, and manually optimized by taking CPU
pipeline structure and register availability into consideration.
The block sizes are picked so that the P× Q block of A fits in
the L2 cache, and the Q × R block of B fits in the L3 cache.
As shown in Figure 3, there is a three-level loop nest
around the macro-kernel. The innermost one is Loop 3, the
intermediate one is Loop 2, and the outermost one is Loop
1. We call the iteration counts in these loops iter3, iter2, and
iter1, respectively, and are given by:
iter3 = dm/Pe; iter2 = dk/Qe; iter1 = dn/Re (1)
Algorithm 1 shows the corresponding pseudo-code with the
three nested loops. Note that, Loop 3 is further split into two
parts, to obtain better cache locality. The first part performs
only the first iteration, and the second part performs the rest.
In all the iterations of Loop 3, the data in the P × Q block
from matrix A is packed into a buffer (function itcopy),
before calling the macro-kernel (function kernel). This is
shown in Figure 3 as arrow ¬ and corresponds to Line 3 and
9 in Algorithm 1. Additionally, in the first part of Loop 3,
the data in the Q × R block from matrix B is also packed
into a buffer (function oncopy). This is shown in Figure 3 as
arrow ­ and corresponds to Line 5 in Algorithm 1. The Q ×
R block from matrix B is copied in units of Q × 3UNROLL
sub-blocks.This breaks down the first part of Loop 3 into a
loop with an iteration count of iter4, given by:
iter4 = dR/3UNROLLe
or iter4 = d(n mod R)/3UNROLLe (2)
where the second expression corresponds to the last iteration
of Loop 1.
5.2 Locating Probing Addresses
Our goal is to find the size of the matrices of Figure 3,
namely, m, k, and n. To do so, we need to first obtain the
number of iterations of Loops 1, 2, and 3, and then use
Equation 1. Note that we know the values of the block sizes
P, Q, and R (as well as UNROLL) — these are constants
available in the open-source code of OpenBLAS.
A straight-forward approach to obtain the number of iter-
ations of Loops 1, 2, and 3 is to monitor the addresses that
hold the instructions of the loop entries. These are Lines 1,
2, and 8 in Algorithm 1, respectively. We could count the
number of times these instructions are executed. However,
this fails because the loop body is very tight. Specifically,
the instructions for Lines 1 and 2 fall into the same cache
line, and Line 8 falls into a cache line that is very close to
them. To disambiguate all the loops, we need to monitor
better addresses.
In this paper, we propose to use, as probing addresses,
addresses in the itcopy, oncopy and kernel functions of
Algorithm 1. To understand why, consider the dynamic invo-
cations to these functions. Figure 4 shows the Dynamic Call
Graph (DCG) of gemm_nn in Algorithm 1. Each iteration of
Loop 2 contains one invocation of function itcopy, followed
by iter4 invocations of the pair oncopy and kernel, and then
(iter3−1) invocations of the pair itcopy and kernel. The
whole sequence in Figure 4 is executed iter1× iter2 times in
one invocation of gemm_nn.
itcopy itcopyoncopy kernel kernel
#pairs=iter4 #pairs=iter3-1
Figure 4: DCG of gemm_nn, with the number of invocations
per iteration of Loop 2.
We will see in Section 5.3 that these invocation counts
are enough to allow us to find the size of the matrices of
Figure 3. However, using the first instruction in itcopy, on-
copy, and kernel as probe addresses is not optimal. Indeed,
we have found that these instructions are sometimes accessed
by prefetchers in the shadow of a branch misprediction. This
introduces noise in the measurements.
Alternatively, we use one instruction inside each function
for the three probe addresses. Further, since the main bodies
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Figure 5: Visualization of execution time of gemm_nn where Loop 1, Loop 2, and Loop3 have 5 iterations each (a); value of
iter4 for each first-iteration of Loop 3 (b).
of these functions are loops, we use instructions that are part
of the loop (to distinguish it from the GEMM loops, we call
it in-function loop). This improves our monitoring capability,
as such instructions are accessed multiple times per function
invocation.
Overall, instructions in the bodies of these three functions
satisfy the conditions for good probing addresses. First, we
will see that the number of accesses to these instructions can
be used to deduce the iteration count of each level of the
loop. Second, these addresses are distant from each other
and, hence, automatic prefetching of instructions does not
introduce noise. Finally, since each function operates on a
block of data, the intervals between consecutive invocations
of these functions are long enough.
Note that, even though this DCG is specific for gemm_nn
in OpenBLAS, it captures two common features for general
blocked matrix multiplication. First, all implementations use
a kernel function as a unit to carry out block-size computation.
Second, there are always packing operations before kernel
execution at two different levels of the loop. A similar DCG
can be extracted for slightly different implementations, such
as Intel’s MKL (Section 6).
5.3 Procedure to Extract Matrix Dimensions
To understand the procedure we use to extract matrix di-
mensions, we note the way OpenBLAS groups blocks into
iterations. Specifically, rather than assigning a small block
to the last iteration, it assigns two equal-sized small blocks
to the last two iterations. For example, as it blocks the n
columns of matrix C in Figure 3 into blocks of size R, it
assigns R columns to each Loop 1 iteration, except for the
last two iterations. Each of the latter receives (R + n mod
R)/2.
Figure 5(a) shows the visualization of the execution time of
gemm_nn where Loop 1, Loop 2, and Loop 3 have 5 iterations
each. It shows the size of the block each iteration operates
on. In Loop 1, the first three iterations use R-sized blocks;
each of the last two use a block of size (R + n mod R)/2. In
Loop 2, the corresponding block sizes are Q and (Q + k mod
Q)/2. In Loop 3, they are P and (P + m mod P)/2.
Recall that the first iteration of every Loop 3 invocation
is special. While it processes a P-sized block, its execution
time is different because it performs a different operation.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 4, it invokes the oncopy-
kernel pair iter4 times. Figure 5(b) shows the value of iter4
for each of the first iterations of Loop 3. As indicated in Equa-
tion 2, during the execution of “normal” Loop 1 iterations,
it is dR/3UNROLLe. However, in the last two iterations of
Loop 1, iter4 is d((R+nmodR)/2)/3UNROLLe.
Based on these insights, our procedure to extract m, k, and
n has four steps.
Step 1: Identify the DCG of Loop 2 iterations, and ex-
tract iter1× iter2. By probing one instruction in each of it-
copy, oncopy, and kernel, we repeatedly obtain the DCG
pattern of Loop 2 iterations (Figure 4). By counting the
number of such patterns, we obtain iter1× iter2.
Step 2: Extract iter3 and determine the value of m. In
the DCG pattern of a Loop 2 iteration, we count the number
of invocations to the itcopy-kernel pair (Figure 4). This
count plus 1 gives iter3. Of all these iter3 iterations, all but
the last two execute a block of size P; the last two execute
a block of size (P + m mod P)/2 each (Figure 5(a)). To
estimate the size of this smaller block, we assume that the
execution time of an iteration is proportional to the block
size it processes — except for the first iteration which, as
we indicated, is different. Hence, we time the execution of
a “normal” iteration of loop L3 and the execution of the last
iteration of Loop 3. Let’s call the times tnormal and tsmall . The
value of m is:
m = (iter3−2)×P+2× tsmalltnormal ×P
Step 3: Extract iter4, iter2 and determine the value of
k. In the DCG pattern of a Loop 2 iteration (Figure 4),
we count the number of oncopy-kernel pairs, and ob-
tain iter4. As shown in Figure 5(b), the value of iter4 is
dR/3UNROLLe in all iterations of Loop 2 except those that
are part of the last two iterations of Loop 1. For the latter,
iter4 is d((R+ nmodR)/2)/3UNROLLe, which is a lower
value. Consequently, by counting the number of DCG pat-
terns that have a low value of iter4, and dividing it by 2, we
attain iter2. We then follow the procedure of Step 2 to cal-
culate k. Specifically, all Loop 2 iterations but the last two
execute a block of size Q; the last two execute a block of
size (Q + k mod Q)/2 each (Figure 5(a)). Hence, we time
the execution of a “normal” iteration and the last one, and
compute k as per Step 2.
Step 4: Extract iter1 and determine the value of n. If
we count the total number of DCG patterns in the execution
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and divide that by iter2, we obtain iter1. We know that all
Loop 1 iterations but the last two execute a block of size R;
the last two execute a block of size (R + n mod R)/2 each. To
compute the latter, we note that, in the last two iterations of
Loop 1, iter4 is d((R+nmodR)/2)/3UNROLLe. Since both
iter4 and 3UNROLL are known, we can compute (R + n mod
R)/2. Hence, the value of n is:
n = (iter1−2)×R+2× iter4×3UNROLL
However, our attack cannot handle the case when the ma-
trix dimension size is less than twice the block size — for
example, when n is less than 2×R. In this case, there is no
iteration that works on a full block. Our procedure cannot
compute the exact value of n, and can only provide a range
of values.
6. GENERALIZATION OF THE ATTACK
Our attack can be generalized to other BLAS libraries,
since all of them use blocked matrix-multiplication, and most
of them implement Goto’s algorithm [41]. Even though they
may differ in the scheduling of the three-level nested loop,
block sizes and implementation of the macro-kernel, our
attack is still effective. In this section, we show that the
same attack strategy can be applied to other BLAS libraries,
using Intel MKL as an example. We choose MKL for two
reasons. First, it is another heavily used library (similar to
OpenBLAS). Second, it is closed source, which makes the
attack more challenging.
Since MKL’s source code is not disclosed, we need to
complete two tasks before extracting matrix parameters. First,
we need to construct the DCG of GEMM using packing and
kernel functions. This requires us to find the proper functions
and their invocation patterns. Second, we need to obtain the
block size of each dimension. In both tasks, we leverage side
channel attacks to assist program analysis.
Constructing the DCG. First, we use GDB to manually
analyze the binary code. We trace down the functions that
are called during matrix multiplication, which we find are the
packing functions copybn, copyan. We find that the kernel
function is called ker0.
Next, we determine function invocation patterns and corre-
late those patterns with loop executions. This can be achieved
in multiple ways. One possible approach is manual analy-
sis, that is, using GDB to trace the dynamic execution path
of GEMM and observe the functions invoked for each loop.
Another approach is leveraging cache-based side channel at-
tacks to probe the packing and kernel functions, and obtain
the invocation patterns.
copybn copybncopyan ker0 ker0
#pairs=iter4 #pairs=iter3-1
Figure 6: DCG of blocked GEMM in Intel MKL, with the
number of invocations per iteration of Loop 2.
We derive the same DCG using the two approaches, shown
in Figure 6. The pattern is the same as the DCG of Open-
BLAS in Figure 4. Thus, the attack strategy in Section 5
should also work towards MKL.
Extracting block sizes. According to Formulas 1 and 2,
there is a discrete linear relationship between the matrix size
and the iteration count. We leverage the side-channel attacks
in Section 5 to count the number of iterations and resolve
block sizes. Specifically, we gradually increase the input
dimension size until the number of iterations increments. For
each dimension, the stride on the input dimension that triggers
the change of iteration count is the block size. By applying
this approach, we can successfully derive block sizes, which
match the sizes we obtain via manual analysis of the MKL
binary code.
Special cases. According to our analysis, MKL follows a
different DCG when dealing with small matrices. Instead of
doing 3-level nested loops as in Figure 6, it uses a single-level
loop, tiling on the dimension that has the largest value among
m, n, k. The computation is done in place, without triggering
packing functions.
For these special cases, we slightly adjust the attack strat-
egy in Figure 5. We use side channels to monitor the number
of iterations on that single-level loop and the time spent for
each iteration. We then use the number of iterations to deduce
the size of the largest dimension. Finally, we use the timing
information for each iteration to deduce the product of the
other two dimensions.
7. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Attack Platform. We evaluate our attacks on a Dell work-
station Precision T1700, which has a 4-core Intel Xeon E3
processor and an 8GB DDR3-1600 memory. The proces-
sor has two levels of private caches and a shared last level
cache. The first level caches are a 32KB instruction cache
and a 32KB data cache. The second level cache is 256KB.
The shared last level cache is 8MB. We test our attacks on
a same-OS scenario using Ubuntu 4.2.0-27. Our attacks
should be applicable to other platforms, as the effectiveness
of Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe has been proved in multi-
ple hardware platforms [18, 17].
Victim DNNs. We use a VGG [37] instance and a
ResNet [2] instance as victim DNNs. VGG is representative
of early DNNs (e.g., AlexNet [36] and LeNet [42]). ResNet
is representative of state-of-the-art DNNs. Both are standard
and widely-used CNNs with a large number of layers and hy-
per-parameters. ResNet additionally features shortcut/branch
connections (Section 4.3).
There are several versions of VGG, with 11 to 19 layers.
All VGGs contain 5 blocks and, within each block, a single
type of layer is replicated. We show our results on VGG-16.
There are several versions of ResNet, whose depth varies
from 18 to 152 layers. All of them consist of the same 4 types
of modules, which are replicated a different number of times.
Each module contains 3 or 4 layers, which are all different.
We show our detection results on ResNet-50.
The victim programs are implemented using the Keras [43]
framework, with Theano [34] as the backend.
8. EVALUATION
We first evaluate our attacks on the GEMM function. We
then show the effectiveness of our attack on neural network
inference. We provide a detailed analysis of extracting the
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DNN architecture for a VGG-16 and a ResNet-50 instance,
and quantify the reduction in the architecture search space.
8.1 Attacking GEMM Using Prime+Probe
We show the results of attacking GEMM using
Prime+Probe, which does not require page sharing or the
use of the clflush instruction. Our attack targets the LLC.
Hence, victim and attacker can run on different cores, further
improving the attack’s flexibility. We locate the LLC sets
of two instructions from itcopy and oncopy, and construct
two sets of eviction addresses using the algorithm proposed
by Liu et al. [18].
Figure 7 shows one raw trace of the execution of one iter-
ation of Loop 2 in Algorithm 1. We only show the latency
above 500 cycles, which indicates victim activities. Note that,
since we select the probe addresses to be within loop bodies
(Section 5.2), a cluster of misses marks the time period when
the victim is executing the probed function. In this trace, the
victim calls itcopy around interval 2000, then calls oncopy
11 times between intervals 2000 and 7000. It then calls it-
copy another two times in intervals 7000 and 13000. The
trace matches the DCG shown in Figure 4, and we can derive
that iter4 = 11 and iter3 = 3.
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Figure 7: Prime+Probe trace of the GEMM execution with
monitoring interval length equal to 2000 cycles.
The noise, such as between intervals 8000 and 12000, can
be trivially distinguished from the actual victim accesses.
The trace can be further cleaned up by leveraging de-nois-
ing techniques [18],[17]. As Prime+Probe can effectively
extract matrix parameters and achieve the same high accu-
racy as Flush+Reload, either can be used to extract DNN
hyper-parameters. Thus, in the rest of this section, we use
Flush+Reload to illustrate our attack.
8.2 Extracting Parameters from DNNs
We show the effectiveness of our attack by extracting the
hyper-parameters of our VGG [37] and ResNet [2] instances.
Figure 8 shows the extracted values of the n, k, and m matrix
parameters for the layers in the 4 distinct modules in ResNet-
50, and for the first layer in each of the 5 blocks in VGG-16.
We do not show the other layers because they are duplicates
of the layers shown. Figures 8(a), (b), and (c) correspond to
the values of n, k, and m, respectively.
In Figure 8, for a given parameter (e.g., m) and a given
layer (e.g., L1 in ResNet-M2), the hollowed circles indicate
the actual value of the parameter. The squares or rectangles
indicate the values of the parameters detected with the side
channel attack. When the side channel attack can only nar-
row down the possible values to a range, the figure shows
a rectangle. Finally, the solid circles indicate the values of
the parameters that we deduce, using the detected values and
some DNN constraints. For example, for parameter m in layer
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Figure 8: Extracted values of the n, k, and m matrix parame-
ters for VGG-16 and ResNet-50.
L1 of ResNet-M2, the actual value is 784, the detected value
range is 524-1536, and the deduced value is 784.
We will discuss how we obtain the solid circles later. Here,
we focus on comparing the actual and detected values (hol-
lowed circles and squares/rectangles). Figure 8(a) shows that
our attack is always able to determine the n dimension size
with ignorable error, thanks to the small subblock size used
in the 1st iteration of Loop 3 (Algorithm 1).
Figures 8(b) and (c) show that the attack is able to ac-
curately determine the m and k values for most layers in
ResNet-M1, ResNet-M4 and all blocks in VGG. However, it
can only derive ranges of values for most of the ResNet-M2
and ResNet-M3 layers. This is because the m and k values in
these layers are often smaller than twice the corresponding
block sizes (Section 5.3).
In summary, our side channel attack can either detect the
matrix parameters with negligible error, or can provide a
range where the actual value falls in. We will later show that
the imprecision from the negligible error and the ranges can
be eliminated after applying DNN constraints.
8.3 Size of Architecture Search Space
The goal of Cache Telepathyis to very substantially reduce
the search space of possible architectures that can match the
oracle architecture. In this section, we compare the number
of architectures in the search space without Cache Telepathy
(which we call Original space), and with Cache Telepathy. In
both cases, we initially reduce the search space by only con-
sidering reasonable hyper-parameters for the layers. Specifi-
cally, for convolutional layers, the number of filters can be a
multiple of 64 (64× i, where 1≤ i≤ 32), and the filter size
can be an integer value between 1 and 11. For fully-connected
layers, the number of neurons can be 2i, where 8≤ i≤ 13.
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8.3.1 Size of the original search space
To be conservative, we assume that the attacker knows
the number of layers and type of each layer in the oracle
DNN. There exist 352 different configurations for each con-
volutional layer without considering pooling or striding, and
6 configurations for each fully-connected layer. Moreover,
considering the existence of branches, given L layers, there
are L×2L−1 possible ways to connect them.
If we do not count potential shortcuts or branches, a net-
work with 13 convolutional layers and 3 fully-connected lay-
ers such as VGG-16 has a search space size of about 4×1035.
If we consider non-sequential connections, for a network
module with only 4 convolutional layers such as Module 1 in
ResNet-50, there are around 5×1011 possible architectures.
Considering that ResNet-50 has 4 different modules, the total
search space will be over 5.8×1046. The search space would
be even larger in an actual attack scenario, since the attacker
would not have any information on the total number of layers
and layer types.
Overall, we can see that the search space is intractable.
Since training each candidate DNN architecture takes hours
to days, relying on the original search space does not lead to
obtaining the oracle DNN architecture.
8.3.2 Determining the reduced search space
Using the detected values of the matrix parameters in Sec-
tion 8.2, we first determine the possible connections between
layers by locating shortcuts/branches and non-sequential con-
nections. For each possible connection configuration, we
calculate the possible hyper-parameters for each layer. The
final search space is computed as
search space =
C
∑
i=1
(
L
∏
j=1
x j) (3)
where C is the total number of possible connection configura-
tions, L is the total number of layers, and x j is the number of
possible combinations of hyper-parameters for layer j.
Determining connections between layers. We first try
to determine the connections between layers. As discussed in
Section 4.3, we can leverage the inter-GEMM latency to de-
termine the sink of a shortcut or a branch. Figure 9 shows the
extracted input and output matrix sizes, and the inter-GEMM
latencies for the layers in ResNet_M1. The inter-GEMM la-
tency for M1_L4 is significantly larger than expected, given
its corresponding input and output matrix sizes, and thus can
be identified as a sink. Using the extracted dimension infor-
mation (values of n and m) in Figure 8, we determine that only
M1_L1 matches the output matrix size of M1_L4. Therefore,
we know that M1_L1 is the source. Further, by applying the
DNN constraints on consecutive layers (Section 4.3), we find
that M1_L1 and M1_L2 are not consecutively connected, be-
cause mM1_L2 cannot be the product of nM1_L1 and the square
of an integer.
Based on the analysis above, we reverse engineer the con-
nections among the 4 layers, as shown in Figure 9. These
connections exactly match the actual ones in ResNet. We use
the same method to derive the possible connection configura-
tions for the other modules.
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Figure 9: Extracting connections between layers in
ResNet_M1.
Determining hyper-parameters for each layer. We
plug the detected matrix parameters into the formulas in
Table 3 to deduce the hyper-parameters for each layer. For
those matrix parameters that cannot be extracted precisely,
we leverage DNN constraints to prune the search space, as
discussed in Section 4.3. For example, for convolutional lay-
ers, we use the n and k dimensions between two consecutive
layers to deduce the number of filters and the filter sizes.
As an example, consider L3 in ResNet_M3. First, we round
the extracted n to the nearest multiple of 64 to get 512, which
is the number of filters in that layer. Since we only have a
very small error when detecting the n dimension, we always
obtain the correct number of filters in Figure 8(a). Second,
we use the formula in Table 3 to determine the filter size. The
value for nM2_L2 is 118, but we cannot determine the value for
kM2_L3. As discussed in Section 4.3, for consecutive layers,
the k dimension of the current layer must be the product of
the n dimension of the last layer and the square of an integer.
Considering that kM2_L3 is within the range [68,384], the only
possible value is 118. In this way, we successfully reduce the
parameter range to a single value, and deduce that the filter
size is 1.
We apply the same methodology for the other layers. With
this method, we obtain the solid circles in Figure 8. In some
cases, this methodology generates two possible deduced
values. For example, this happens for the k parameter in
ResNet_M3 Layer 4. In this case, we have two solid circles
in Figure 8, and we have to consider both architectures.
Determining pooling/striding. We use the differences in
the m dimension between consecutive layers to determine the
pool or stride size. For example, we see that the m dimen-
sion changes from ResNet_M1 to ResNet_M2. Even though
we cannot precisely determine the value of mM2_L1, we can
use DNN constraints to reduce the possible number of pool-
ing/striding sizes. As discussed in Section 4.3, the reduction
in the m dimension must be the square of an integer. Since
mM1_L4 = 3072 and mM2_L1 is within the range [524,1536],
we can deduce that mM2_L1 is 768 and that the pool/stride size
is 2. Since we cannot distinguish between pool layers and
stride operations, we still have two possible configurations in
the final search space: one with a pool layer, and one with a
stride operation.
8.3.3 The size of the reduced search space
Based on the previous discussion, Table 4 shows the origi-
nal size of the search space, and the reduced one after using
Cache Telepathy. Recall that we calculate the original space
assuming that the attacker already knows the total number of
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DNN Original: No Using Cache Telepathy
Side Channel OpenBLAS MKL
ResNet-50 > 5.8×1046 512 6144
VGG-16 > 4×1035 16 64
Table 4: Comparing the original and reduced search spaces.
layers and the type of layers, which is a conservative assump-
tion.
Using Cache Telepathy, we are able to significantly reduce
the search space from an intractable size to a reasonable size.
The reduced search space is smaller in the VGG network
because of its relatively small number of layers. Further, our
attacks on MKL are less effective than on OpenBLAS. This
is because the matrix sizes in ResNet_M4 are small, and
MKL handles these matrices specially (Section 6). Even after
applying DNN constraints, we can only limit the number of
possible values for some parameters in each layer of that
module to 2 or 4, which leads to the wider space size.
9. COUNTERMEASURES
We overview possible countermeasures against our attack,
and discuss their effectiveness and performance implications.
Since our attack targets BLAS libraries, we first investi-
gate whether it is possible to stop the attack by modifying
the libraries. One approach is to use less aggressive optimiza-
tion. It is unfeasible to abandon blocking completely, since
unblocked matrix multiplication has poor cache performance.
However, it is possible to use a less aggressive blocking, with
tolerable performance degradation. Specifically, we can re-
move the optimization for the first iteration of Loop 3 (Lines
4-7 in Algorithm 1). In this case, it will be difficult for the
attacker to precisely recover the values of n and k without a
much more detailed timing analysis.
Another approach is to reduce the sizes of the dimensions
of the matrices. If the sizes of two or more dimensions of a
matrix are smaller than the block size, the attacker can only
obtain ranges for the values of those dimensions. This makes
the attack much harder. There are existing techniques to re-
duce the sizes of the dimensions of a matrix. For example,
linear quantization reduces the weight and input precision,
which means that the matrix becomes smaller. This mitigation
is typically effective for the last few layers in a convolutional
network, which use relatively small matrices. However, it
cannot protect layers with large matrices, such as those using
a large number of filters and input activations.
Alternatively, one can use existing cache-based side chan-
nel defense mechanisms. One approach is to disallow re-
source sharing. For example, the MLaaS provider can disal-
low server sharing between different users. However, this is
an extreme solution with major disadvantages in throughput.
Another approach is to disable page sharing and page de-du-
plication. Unfortunately, while this defeats the Flush+Reload
attack, it does not defeat Prime+Probe.
Another approach is to use cache partitioning, such as Intel
CAT (Cache Allocation Technology), which assigns differ-
ent ways of the LLC to different applications [44]. Since
attackers may also target data access patterns, both code
and data need to be protected in the cache. This means that
the GEMM block size needs to be adjusted to the reduced
number of available ways in the LLC. There will be some per-
formance degradation due to reduced LLC capacity, but this
is likely a good trade-off between performance and security.
Further, there are proposals for security-oriented cache
mechanisms such as PLCache [45], Random Fill Cache [46],
SHARP [47] and SecDCP [48]. If these mechanisms are
adopted in production hardware, they can mitigate our attack
with moderate performance degradation. Finally, one can
add security features to performance-oriented cache partition-
ing proposals [49],[50],[51],[52], to achieve better trade-offs
between security and performance.
10. RELATEDWORK
Recent research has called attention to the confidentiality
of ML hyper-parameters. Hua et al. [53] designed the first
attack to steal CNN architectures running on a hardware
accelerator. Their attack is based on a different threat model,
which requires the attacker to be able to monitor all of the
memory accesses issued by the victim, including the type
and address of each access. Our attack does not require such
elevated privilege.
Cache-based side channel attacks have been used to trace
program execution to steal sensitive information. However,
there is no existing cache-based side channel attack that can
achieve the goal of extracting all the hyper-parameters of a
DNN, given the complexity of DNN computations, and the
multi-level loop structure of GEMM, as well as the high num-
ber of parameters to extract. Most side channel attacks target
cryptography algorithms, such as AES [54, 19, 55], RSA [18,
17] and ECDSA [56]. These attacks directly correlate binary
bits within the secret key with either branch execution or ma-
trix location access. Our attack on GEMM requires careful
selection of probing addresses, and complicated post-analysis.
Furthermore, our attack can extract a much higher number of
hyper-parameters, instead of a secret key.
GEMM is an important application in high-performance
computing, and there is a popular line of research on im-
proving the memory hierarchy performance of GEMM
(e.g., [57],[58],[59]).
11. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed Cache Telepathy: a fast and ac-
curate mechanism to steal a DNN’s architecture using cache-
based side channel attacks. We identified that DNN inference
relies heavily on blocked GEMM, and provided a detailed se-
curity analysis of this operation. We then designed an attack
to extract the input matrix parameters of GEMM calls, and
scaled this attack to complete DNNs. We used Prime+Probe
and Flush+Reload to attack VGG and ResNet DNNs running
OpenBLAS and Intel MKL libraries. Our attack is effective
in helping obtain the architectures by very substantially re-
ducing the search space of target DNN architectures. For
example, for VGG using OpenBLAS, it reduced the search
space from more than 1035 architectures to just 16.
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